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Abstract
Research Question/Issue: We investigate outside director departures prior to management buyout offers
(MBOs). In these transactions, managers have both an information advantage and incentives to make a lowball
offer to shareholders. Outside directors can safeguard against managerial self‐dealing by negotiating for the best
terms for public shareholders from either management or another bidder. Research Findings/Insights: It is
typical that outside directors stay on the board through an MBO offer as MBOs are less likely to have changes in

directors—either joining or leaving—relative to a control sample. After controlling for endogeneity as well as
firm and director characteristics, we find that outside directors are more likely to leave when the offer is later
contested. We do not find any evidence that departing directors are replaced by new outside directors who
ensure shareholders get a higher premium nor do we find any evidence that the board acts as a public
auctioneer. We also find that outside directors are more likely to depart when the buyout contest is longer. Our
findings show that outside directors provide a weak internal monitoring mechanism as they leave precisely
when shareholders need their expertise the most. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results contribute to
research that supports the notion that outside director departures are symptomatic of board weakness. The
results of our study support the contention of other researchers that outside directors often fail to monitor
managers. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study offers useful information to M&A investment banking
advisors and leverage buyout analysts by showing the mechanisms under which director turnover can affect the
value and the outcome of MBOs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The role outside directors play in monitoring managers has been the subject of extensive research. Fama and
Jensen's seminal 1983 paper launched the discussion arguing that outside directors have incentives to monitor
management to protect their reputations as decision experts. Many studies support the notion that outside
directors are effective monitors (see, e.g., Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Cotter,
Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997; Hanson & Song, 2000; Nguyen & Nielsen, 2010; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990;
Weisbach, 1988). However, some researchers question the independence and effectiveness of outside directors
given that management largely controls the nominating process (see Arena & Ferris, 2007; Shivdasani &
Yermack, 1999). Goergen and Renneboog (2014) review the literature and conclude that the role that
independent directors play in advocating for shareholders' interests remains unsettled. We contribute to the
research on outside directors and board dynamics by examining director turnover prior to management buyout
(MBO) offers, a transaction where managers have an inherent conflict of interest with shareholders.
Outside directors can play an important role by advocating for public shareholders during the MBO contest—the
"fight" hypothesis. Yet prior research suggests there is a potential cost for outside directors who stay on the
board when the MBO offer is contested. Harford (2003) studies what happens to directors' future board seats
and the accompanying directors' fees after a takeover bid. He finds that for outside directors, the direct financial
impact of a completed merger is negative. He concludes that when outside directors fail as monitors, forcing the
external control market to act for them, there is a partial settling‐up in the directorial labor market. Other
researchers have also found that outside directors bear costs when the firm faces adverse events. Fich and
Shivdasani (2007) find that outside directors lose future board seats when there is a financial fraud lawsuit
against the firm where they serve as a director. Srinivasan (2005) finds the reputation of outside directors is
damaged when they are on boards of firms that restate earnings. Gilson (1990) finds that outside directors lose
board seats when they serve on boards of firms experiencing financial distress. These findings suggest that
outside directors are likely to leave the board prior to the MBO offer when they think that the offer is weak and
could be contested. These directors leave to avoid being tainted in the directorial labor market by avoiding any
involvement in a transaction in which the external control market intervenes to correct board failings; this is the
"flee" hypothesis.
Additionally, outside directors can have conflicting loyalties and reputational concerns in these transactions. On
the one hand, they have incentives to create a reputation among the shareholders who elect them as watchdogs

against management entrenchment. Institutional shareholders can vote against directors nominated to the
board when the firm's performance and corporate governance practices are weak (see Del Guercio, Seery, &
Woidtke, 2008). On the other hand, outside directors may wish to cultivate a reputation for going along with the
managers who nominate them, as this can lead to more board seats and higher compensation (see Brick,
Palmon, & Wald, 2006; Dah & Frye, 2017; Nguyen, 2014). We hypothesize that the tension created by these
conflicting reputational concerns is likely to cause directors to depart, that is, flee. By avoiding controversy, they
can preserve their reputations as independent monitors while maintaining a friendly attitude toward
management.
In this study, we focus only on buyouts of U.S. firms. A cross‐country investigation would prevent us from
providing the depth of analysis we offer in this paper, as regulatory and institutional contexts are vastly different
across countries and economies in different phases of development. First, procedurally, the parties involved in
the transactions are not uniform across regions due to differences in available sources of financing, in the
impacts of debt pressure, and, in some cases, due to the absence of private equity. Second, differences in
regulatory approval across countries are likely to significantly impact the interaction between governance and
the business rationale for an MBO transaction (see Wright, Scholes, & Yao, 2010). However, our results have
implications for directors' incentives to stay on a board in non‐U.S. settings. Our methodology for investigating
director changes can provide guidance for researchers who study non‐U.S. buyouts.
For a sample of MBO offers from 1999 through 2016, we compare both board composition and board turnover
to a control sample. We find that the boards of firms with MBO offers have a higher percentage of insiders. We
find that while board composition is stable during the 2 years preceding the MBO, there is considerable turnover
in the individual directors who serve on the board. About a third of the board turns over for both samples. We
also find that when there is an MBO offer, directors are more likely to stay beyond what can be explained as
routine vis‐à‐vis our control sample. Thus, the MBO offer itself does not lead to more director departures.
Further, these observed departures are more likely to occur when the MBO offer is subsequently challenged by
either shareholders or a competitive bidder. While outside director departures can be a form of monitoring by
signaling to a competitive bidder that the management's offer is weak, this type of monitoring is likely to be less
effective than staying on the board and actively seeking higher offers from competitive bidders and/or blocking
management from adopting anti‐takeover amendments designed to discourage other bidders.
After controlling for firm and director characteristics, fixed effects, and the endogenous relation between
director turnover and MBO‐related factors, we find that outside directors provide a weak internal monitoring
mechanism as they are likely to leave precisely when shareholders need them to ensure that the buyout offer is
fair. The results of our study support Jensen's (1993) contention that outside directors often fail to monitor
managers.
Professional directors or those who are retired from their primary profession are more likely to depart when the
MBO offer is challenged than other types of outside directors. Professional directors are likely to be more
sensitive to protecting future board seats than directors who are currently working and have alternative sources
of compensation. We find only weak evidence that professional directors are more likely to depart than other
types of outsiders. We do not find any evidence that departing outside directors are replaced by new outside
directors who may have better expertise in navigating a contentious MBO offer. Nor do we find any evidence
that when directors depart, the board they leave engages in actions to auction off the firm to the highest bidder.
Finally, we report mixed results on our tests regarding whether outside directors depart to avoid the time
required in a buyout. The overall weight of our findings suggests that outside directors "flee" rather than "fight"
on behalf of the interests of shareholders.

Our study makes several contributions. First, we contribute to a growing body of research on outside director
departures. Fields and Gupta (2009) show that when a company announces an outside director resignation, the
market responds negatively. Agrawal and Chen (2017) and Dewally and Peck (2010) show that outside directors
leave when there are disputes with management and often publicly criticize the firm. Farrell and
Whidbee (2000) find that when the CEO is forced out of the firm, outside directors leave too. Fahlenbrach, Low,
and Stulz (2010) show that outside directors' incentives to protect their reputations increase the likelihood of
their resigning when the firm is performing poorly. Overall, these studies provide evidence that outside
directors' departures can indicate problems with management. If directors are unable or unwilling to reign in
management, they are likely to leave. Our results add to this evidence.
Second, our findings corroborate studies that show that insiders time their efforts to go private when they know
that the firm is undervalued. Harford, Stanfield, and Zhang (2019) provide evidence that insiders make MBO
offers when they have private information that the industry is undervalued and hence time the offer to exploit
public shareholders. Our observation that outside directors resign prior to an offer that later is likely to be
considered unfair is consistent with insiders using their information advantage to exploit shareholders.
Finally, our findings highlight the importance of accounting for changes in corporate governance structures
during MBOs specifically and changes in corporate control more generally. While there are many studies on
board composition post‐buyout (see Renneboog & Vansteenskiste, 2017, for a review of this literature), there is
little research examining changes prior to the buyout announcement. In a global study, Cornelli and
Karakas (2008) report that for a sample of MBOs firms' board size declined, and that for a sample of leverage
buyout firms the percentage of outsiders declines in the 5 years prior to the offer. Wright et al. (2010) provide a
more detailed analysis for a sample of 19 firms, and like our empirical approach, they use a control sample to
measure changes in the board prior to the offer. They find that board size declines prior to the MBO but find no
differences in board size between MBO firms and a set of control firms, which is consistent with our findings.
Wright et al. (2010) find that the percentage of independent or outside directors increases in preparation for an
MBO. It is to be expected that major transactions in a firm's life cycle lead to board restructuring. In addition to
board size, we also find that board composition is static over the 3‐year period prior to the MBO. However,
about a third of the individual board members turn over for both our MBO and control samples. Future
researchers need to consider that boards are dynamic and can change in response to changes in control.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses prior research and develops our
hypotheses and related tests. The third section describes how we construct both our MBO and control samples,
how we track director turnover, and how we categorize directors. The following section provides our results on
the differences in director turnover between our MBO offer and control samples. Next, we present evidence
that directors leave the board when the offer is more likely to be contested. In the last section, we provide
suggestions for future research.

2 PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Prior research on MBO offers

In management buyout offers, management attempts to take the firm private by purchasing the firm from
public shareholders. There is an inherent conflict between managers and shareholders in these transactions—
managers have an incentive to purchase the firm as cheaply as possible while shareholders want to receive the
highest price possible in exchange for their shares. Further, as insiders, managers have an information
advantage over public shareholders on the intrinsic value of the firm. Consequently, a stream of research
investigates whether managers time these transactions to exploit their information advantage over public
shareholders (see DeAngelo, 1986; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice, 1984; Harford et al., 2019; Kaplan, 1989).

Researchers also have investigated the efficacy of mechanisms that check managerial self‐dealing in MBOs.
Safeguards can take either the form of legal and corporate processes or competitive bidding in the market for
corporate control. Cain and Davidoff (2011) provide a review of the laws and regulations of MBO transactions.
Some of the legal and procedural mechanisms include using an auction process to ensure the highest bid prior
to the public MBO announcement, limiting the use of deal termination fees, forming special committees of
independent directors to evaluate the fairness of the offer, requiring fairness opinions from third‐party
investment bankers, and using "go shop" provisions. "Go shop" provisions allow the company to solicit offers for
a prespecified period after the initial buyout announcement. Researchers have found mixed results on whether
these safeguards lead to higher premiums for shareholders. Cain and Davidoff (2011) find that the "go shop"
provision, an auction, or termination fees do not impact the final bid premium. However, they find that
premiums are higher for successful MBOs in the presence of a special committee of outside directors. In
contrast, Boone and Mulherin (2017) find that special committees do not increase bid premiums in a broader
sample of mergers and acquisitions, and in a subset of going private transactions, they find that premiums
are lower when a special committee is used. In a sample of mergers and acquisitions, Kisgen, Qian, and
Song (2009) find that fairness opinions do not increase, and in some cases decrease, the premium paid to target
shareholders.
These studies' mixed results are consistent with researchers who argue that legal safeguards can be inherently
weak (see Bebchuk & Kahan, 1989; Carney, 1992; Davidoff, 2006; DeAngelo, 1990; Elson, 1992). One weakness is
that managers can use these legal mechanisms to rubber‐stamp their offers. Another weakness is that
shareholders seeking legal recourse force courts to evaluate the fairness of an offer using a sample of one.
Outside directors can act as an internal control mechanism to guard against managerial self‐dealing. Prior
studies on the role of outside directors on the outcome of control contests are mixed. Byrd and Hickman (1992)
find that when at least 50% of board seats are held by outside directors, a bidding firm will have higher
announcement‐date abnormal returns. However, at 60% or higher representation, these abnormal returns
decline. Cotter et al. (1997) find that target bid premiums are higher when independent directors make up at
least 50% of target's board, yet, unlike Byrd and Hickman (1992), they do not test whether this finding holds true
for 60% or higher representation. Finally, Güber, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) investigate the role outside
directors' professional backgrounds have on control contests. They find that when investment bankers are on
the board, the firm makes worse acquisitions.
The market for corporate control arguably provides a more effective restraint against managerial self‐dealing.
When outside bidders, including both financial and strategic buyers, notice that managers are attempting to buy
the firm from shareholders at a discount, they might offer a competing bid. Strategic buyers can decide that
even at a higher price, the acquisition still provides value to their firm (i.e., positive net present value project).
Financial buyers can offer a higher bid to reap the benefits of a nonpublic restructuring and the subsequent sale
or IPO of a firm that is worth more. Or financial buyers can bid to flush out a higher bid from either management
or another bidder and make a profit on a "toehold" (see Peck, 1996).
Unlike the mixed findings for the effectiveness of legal mechanisms, the literature consistently finds that a
competitive bidder increases the premiums paid to shareholders. Easterwood, Singer, Seth, and Lang (1994) find
that for completed MBOs, public competitive bidding yields higher target returns than board negotiations or
shareholder litigation. Peck (1996) finds evidence that control specialists identify low‐priced MBO offers and
facilitate competitive bidding, which, in turn, increases the likelihood that the MBO offer fails and the firm is
taken over by a third party offering a higher bid. Officer, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find less bidding competition
leads to lower premiums. Gogineni and Puthenpurackal (2014) also report that the incidence of a competitive
bid increases the final premium.

Further, when management announces an MBO offer, it is by no means a "done deal." Peck (1996) reports that
offers are often challenged and the buyout contest can be contentious: a competitive offer can be made,
shareholders can contest the offer via public announcements, management can adopt anti‐takeover defenses,
and, finally, management can revise their original offer. We investigate whether outside directors "flee" to avoid
a contentious buyout contest or stay and "fight" for the highest offer for shareholders.

2.2 Hypothesis development—"fight" or "flee"

In the context of the existing research on procedural and legal safeguards on the one hand and the market for
corporate control on the other, we investigate changes in board composition as the internal procedural
mechanism along with market control as the external mechanism. Yet, in evaluating the changes in board
composition, we take a market perspective by focusing on the economic incentives of outside directors in MBO
offers. Our overarching hypothesis is that, while outside directors have a fiduciary duty to ensure that public
shareholders are paid a fair price, their own economic self‐interest often precludes them from doing so.
To investigate our central hypothesis, we develop and test a series of competing hypotheses. First, when
examining any turnover around MBOs, we want to be able to distinguish between ordinary turnover and
turnover associated with an upcoming MBO offer. We define turnover as whether a director leaves, joins, or
stays on the board. If the turnover we observe prior to an MBO offer is no different than that at otherwise
similar firms, we cannot argue that any observed turnover is related to the MBO offer. We test this "routine
turnover" hypothesis in a multivariate setting by investigating whether director turnover in our MBO sample is
different from a control sample after controlling for both individual director and firm characteristics. Our results
show that typically directors are more likely to stay through the MBO offer than for our control sample.
Second, given that directors have a greater propensity to stay on the board, we ask whether any director
departures are related to how the MBO contest develops, especially if the offer is challenged. Yet it is also
possible that when directors leave, they signal to potential competitive bidders and shareholders that the offer
is weak. Thus, we jointly estimate the likelihood of net director departures and whether the MBO offer is
challenged while controlling for both firm and other pertinent contest characteristics. We find that net
departures and a challenge to the MBO offer are positively related.
Third, we test our central hypothesis that outside director departures are driven by the likelihood that the MBO
offer is contested—the "flee" hypothesis. Outside directors are likely to leave when management's offer is weak,
whether because of the price or a lack in the board's ability or willingness to negotiate terms. Thus, we jointly
estimate the likelihood of an outside director's leaving and whether the MBO offer is challenged while
controlling for individual director, firm, and other pertinent contest characteristics. We find that outside
directors are more likely to leave when the MBO offer is challenged.
Our fourth hypothesis is that outside directors with higher reputation costs are more likely to leave to avoid
being involved in contentious MBOs. We call this the "reputation cost" hypothesis and use the classification of
outside directors—professional (retired), active managers, and financial, accounting, and legal professionals—to
proxy for a director's reputation cost. As stated previously, professional directors are likely to have higher
reputation costs than other directors. While we do find that professional directors are more likely to leave when
the offer is contested, the result is only marginally significant. Additionally, directors may be unwilling to stay on
the board in anticipation of a lengthy transaction regardless of whether the offer is contested by either
shareholders or a competitive bidder. Thus, we call our fifth hypothesis the "time cost" hypothesis. Again, we
test these hypotheses by including the director's professional background and the contest length in
simultaneous equation multivariate regressions to estimate the likelihood that the MBO offer is contested and
an outside director leaves after controlling for other individual director and firm characteristics. In some of our

regression specifications, we find that when the contest length is longer, outside directors are more likely to
leave.
We also investigate whether outside directors leave knowing that remaining board members will take public
actions to encourage a bidding contest (the "board public auctioneer" hypothesis). The board can encourage
bidding by announcing that they have rejected bids, either management's or a competitive bidder's, or that they
are shopping for bids. We find the board takes any of these actions infrequently, and we do not observe any
relation between the frequency of these actions and director turnover.
Our final alternative hypothesis is that when outside directors leave, new outside directors who have more
experience in corporate control transactions replace them, and, in turn, negotiate a higher premium for these
MBOs (the "replacement" hypothesis). If this were true, there would be evidence that outside
directors do provide a strong internal monitoring mechanism, with new outside directors stepping in to look out
for shareholders' interests. We measure replacement by adding the number of outside directors who depart to
the number of new outside directors who join the board. We scale this measure by the size of the board. As
more outside directors depart and more outside directors join the board relative to board size, the extent of
outside director replacement on the board is greater. We test the "replacement" hypothesis by jointly
estimating buyout premiums with our measure of outside director replacement. If the "replacement" hypothesis
was true, we would expect to find a statistically significant positive relation between premiums and outside
director replacement, but we find none. Overall, our results support the conclusion that outside directors are
likely to leave to avoid representing shareholders' interests during what is likely to be a contested MBO offer.
Our findings suggest that outside director departures are symptomatic of board weakness.

3 DATA DESCRIPTION
3.1 Sample construction

We identify a preliminary sample of 231 MBOs of U.S.‐based publicly held companies from 1999 through 2016
using Thomson ONE Banker (SDC). We follow our firms for up to 2 years after the announcement and collect
board and financial data for 3 years before the announcement. We use this longer window since existing
research finds that board turnover is "sticky." On one end of the spectrum of the firm's life cycle, when boards
go public, Crutchley, Garner, and Marshall (2002) find that board changes related to IPO performance occur
during a year +2 to year +5 window post IPO. At the other end of the spectrum, when firms return to private
ownership, Wright et al. (2010) examine director changes for a sample of Chinese MBOs using a year −5 to up to
a year +8 window around the MBO transaction. Furthermore, Harford et al. (2019) find that management times
MBO offers when the prior 5 years show industry underperformance. This suggests that management begins
contemplating a buyout for some time before they announce the offer, allowing outside directors enough time
to leave prior to a problematic offer.
We collect financial data from COMPUSTAT. We collect board data in part manually from proxy statements and
in part from RiskMetrics, which starts its data coverage in 1996. Thus, our initial sample includes
announcements from 1999 through 2016, and our data collection spans from 1996 through 2018. Our two major
considerations for inclusion in our final sample are that the firm has board data from years −3 to −1 relative to
the year the MBO is announced and that the firm has sufficient financial data available for our empirical tests.[1]
We lose 88 firms because of missing financial data on COMPUSTAT or missing board data. Our final sample
consists of 143 MBO firms.
We create a matched control sample through propensity score matching. We obtain the propensity scores by
computing predicted probabilities of receiving an MBO bid with nearest neighbor matching based on assets,
leverage, ROA, and Q. The propensity scores are computed on the entire COMPUSTAT universe with the

exclusion of the MBO firms. The 143 control firms are the nearest neighbor matches based collectively on those
four variables conditional on director data availability for the years preceding the MBO announcement.
To evaluate the quality of the matching, in Table 1, we present the t test statistics of the difference of the mean
and Wilcoxon statistics for the matching variables between the sample and control firms. The mean and median
of total assets, ROA, and Q are not significantly different between the sample and the control firms. The mean
and median for leverage are different between the sample and control at the 10% significance level. It is
important to note that the propensity score matching identifies the control firm that is the closest to each
sample firm based on all four firm characteristics (assets, leverage, ROA, and Q) taken together. Even though
firms that entertain the possibility of an MBO are unique in financial and performance characteristics (see
Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990), the results of Table 1 show that our propensity score matching procedure
performed well to help us generate a comparable set of control firms. To further mitigate the concern that the
MBO and control firms are not perfectly matched (mostly for leverage), we control for firm‐level characteristics
in the multivariate analysis.
1 TABLE. Propensity matching goodness of fit
Sample (𝑁𝑁 = 143)
Control (𝑁𝑁 = 143)
t test
Wilcoxon
Mean
Median Mean
Median p value p value
Total assets 1,118
120
1,393
168
0.445
0.672
Leverage
0.262
0.205
0.174
0.095
0.098* 0.089*
ROA
0.022
0.062
−0.008
0.040
0.227
0.129
Q
1.192
1.041
1.242
1.057
0.546
0.472
Note. This table presents the mean and median values of total assets, leverage, ROA, and Q for the sample firms
and control firms. The values are reported for the year preceding the MBO announcement for each sample firm
and the corresponding control firm. We selected the control firm through propensity score matching by
computing predicted probabilities of receiving an MBO bid with nearest neighbor matching based on assets,
leverage, ROA, and Q. The control firms are the nearest neighbor matches based on those four variables
conditional on director data availability.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.

3.2 Tracking directors' turnover, director types, and corporate governance

We carefully check director names for each firm to ensure that slight variations in name spelling, along with
other identifying information such as age and professional background, do not signal a change in the director
where there is none. We track turnover by checking for each firm whether a director identified by name
continues to serve on the board from the previous year or is new to the board. We then track whether each
director leaves, joins, or stays on the board from year to year. Finally, for each director per firm, we classify the
director as either staying during the entire 2‐year period or joining or leaving the board during that time. Our
tracking process yields 2,367 unique director‐firm observations, 1,178 MBO firms' directors, and 1,189 control
firms' directors.
We use the information contained in the proxies or the information given in RiskMetrics to create five categories
of directors. First, we group directors who are executives, retired executives from the firm, or related to insiders
as "inside" directors. We define all other directors as "outside" directors or "outsiders." Second, we group
executives who are retired from their primary profession as "professional" directors. Because these directors are
retired, their time cost associated with monitoring is likely to be lower, which, in turn, is likely to make them

better monitors (see Brickley et al., 1994) but also more interested in board compensation. Additionally, since
these directors are retired, they are likely to seek board seats and the compensation that goes with them. Third,
we group outside directors who are lawyers, accountants, commercial bankers, corporate finance officers,
investment professionals, individual investors, or directors who are retired from these professions as "finance,
accounting, or legal professionals" (retired finance, accounting, and legal professionals are excluded from the
"professional directors" category). During a buyout transaction, directors who have legal and/or financial
backgrounds are likely to be particularly important in overseeing and advising on the transaction. Fourth, we
group outside directors who are executives of other firms as "active managers." Finally, all other types of
outside directors are classified as "other." This last category includes academics, past or current government
officials or members of public policy commissions, philanthropists, and members of other professions, for
example, medical.
Corporate governance characteristics are likely to be an important determinant of an individual director's
decision to stay on the board. We report the differences between the MBO offer group and the control sample
on several board measures in Table 2. Firms with offers have boards that are more likely to be dominated by
insiders and the CEO, as the CEO is more likely to be the board chair (see Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997). The
table also shows that there is a smaller percentage of directors who are active directors on the boards of firms
with MBO offers to allow for a higher percentage of insiders on the board. Firms that are positioned for a
management‐led buyout transaction are likely to be dominated by insiders. We also find that the median age for
directors is lower for firms with MBO offers. Younger executives might be more willing to risk taking the firm
private with a longer time horizon to realize the returns from going private. Finally, the total percentage of
shares held by insiders is higher for firms with MBO offers. Share ownership provides economic incentives to
buy out the firm from public shareholders, as directors who own more shares effectively have a "toehold" that
lowers their costs of acquiring publicly held shares. Higher ownership also provides a means to discourage
competitive bidders.
2 TABLE. Differences in board characteristics between management buyout offers and control sample
Board characteristics
Sample
Control
(𝑁𝑁 = 143)
(𝑁𝑁 = 143)
Number of directors on board
Mean
7.077
6.951
Median 7.000
7.000
CEO is board chair
%
79.720
49.650
Total percentage of shares outstanding held by inside
Mean
29.887
13.813
directors
Median 21.698
6.862
Total percentage of shares outstanding held by outside
Mean
6.670
9.295
directors
Median 1.382
2.098
Percentage of directors who are professional directors
Mean
12.564
10.597
Median 12.500
0.000
Percentage of directors who are insiders
Mean
35.795
30.944
Median 33.333
28.571
Percentage of directors who are active managers
Mean
23.440
30.775
Median 21.429
33.333
Percentage of directors who are financial, accounting, or legal Mean
24.169
22.557
Median 22.222
20.000
Median age of directors
Mean
55.476
57.080
Median 55.000
58.000
Median tenure of directors
Mean
6.570
6.958

***
***
***

***
***
***
***
**
**

Median 6.000
6.000
Note. This table presents tests of the differences in various board characteristics for the sample of firms with
management buyouts compared with the control sample. Management buyout offers from 1999 through 2016
are from Thomson ONE deal data that have sufficient board and financial data. The control sample consists of
firms matched with propensity score matching. Directors who are executives, retired executives from the firm,
or related to insiders are "inside" directors. Executives who are retired from their primary profession are
"professional" directors. Directors who are lawyers, accountants, commercial bankers, corporate finance
officers, investment professionals, individual investors, or directors who are retired from these professions are
"legal and finance professionals" (retired finance and legal professionals are excluded from the "professional
directors" category). Differences in means are tested using a t test. Differences in medians are tested using a
Wilcoxon test.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.

4 DIRECTOR TURNOVER ACROSS SAMPLES

Table 3 shows the differences in the types of directors on the board across time and across samples. Panel A
shows that for both years −1 and −3, firms with MBOs have more insider directors and fewer directors who are
active managers than firms in the control sample. These findings are consistent with those reported in Table 2.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the differences in the samples' board compositions are statistically significant.
Panel B also shows that the composition of the board does not change significantly between years −3 and −1 for
either sample. However, while the composition of the board in both samples remains relatively stable over the 2
years, the individual directors on the board do change.
3 TABLE. Board composition
Panel A: Statistics
Type of director
Active manager
Financial, accounting, or Legal
Insider
Professional director
Other
Total
Panel B: Tests
Across MBOs and controls
Across MBOs and controls
Within MBOs across years

Management buyout
offers (𝑁𝑁 = 143)
Year −3
240
23.72%
246
24.31%
353
34.88%
129
12.75%
44
4.35%
1,012

Year −1
257
25.75%
241
24.15%
333
33.37%
119
11.92%
48
4.81%
998

Control sample
(𝑁𝑁 = 143)
Year −3
317
31.89%
220
22.13%
297
29.88%
109
10.97%
51
5.13%
994

χ2 test of difference in frequency of director types
Year −3
0.0008***

Year −1
326
32.53%
223
22.26%
291
29.04%
112
11.18%
50
4.99%
1,002

Year −1
0.7915

0.0178**

Within controls across years
0.9941
Note. This table presents univariate statistics about the composition of the board 3 years and 1 year before the
MBO announcement. Management buyout offers from 1999 through 2016 are from Thomson ONE deal data
that have sufficient board and financial data. The control sample consists of firms matched with propensity
score matching. Board turnover is measured in years −3 to −1 relative to the year of MBO announcement.
Directors who are executives, retired executives from the firm, or related to insiders are "inside" directors.
Executives who are retired from their primary profession are "professional" directors. Directors who are
lawyers, accountants, commercial bankers, corporate finance officers, investment professionals, individual
investors, or directors who are retired from these professions are "legal and finance professionals" (retired
finance and legal professionals are excluded from the "professional directors" category).
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 4 reports the frequency of turnover for different types of directors over the 3‐year period prior to the
MBO announcement. On average, about a third of the board turns over in 2 years. Since boards are small (for
our two samples, they are typically between six to eight directors), the change of a third of individuals can have
a significant impact on board dynamics. New directors on the board can provide time‐sensitive expertise and a
fresh set of eyes to monitor management and shape the strategic direction of the firm. New directors, however,
are likely to be less informed on firm operations and less familiar with other directors' communication styles and
group dynamics during board deliberations. Researchers have argued that while outside directors can provide
independence to board deliberations, they also are less well‐informed than insiders, which can limit their ability
to effectively monitor managers (see Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Cavaco, Crifo, Rebérioux, & Roudaut, 2017; Harris
& Raviv, 2008; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005).

4 TABLE. Board turnover
Panel A: Statistics

Management
buyout offers
(𝑁𝑁 = 143)
Join

Type of director
Active manager
Financial, accounting, or legal
Insider
Professional director
Other
Total
Number of unique
Observations
Panel B: Tests

60
19.87%
41
14.34%
40
10.26%
20
13.61%
8
15.09%
169
14.35%

Control sample
Leave

Stay

37
12.25%
42
14.69%
63
16.15%
32
21.77%
6
11.32%
180
15.28%

205
67.88%
203
70.98%
287
73.59%
95
64.63%
39
73.58%
829
70.37%

Number of unique
observations
302
286
390
147
53
1,178
100.00%

(𝑁𝑁 = 143)
Join

Leave

Stay

76
19.39%
48
18.18%
50
14.45%
18
13.85%
6
10.53%
198
16.65%

63
16.07%
41
15.53%
54
15.61%
27
20.77%
6
10.53%
191
16.06%

253
64.54%
175
66.29%
242
69.94%
85
65.38%
45
78.95%
800
67.28%

χ2 test of difference in frequency of listed type of directors and director turnover

Within MBOs

0.0132***

Within Controls

0.2599

Number of unique
observations
392
264
346
130
57
1,189
100.00%

Note. This table presents tests of the differences in the type of directors joining, leaving, and staying for a
sample of firms with management buyouts both compared with a control sample and within each subsample.
Management buyout offers from 1999 through 2016 are from Thomson ONE deal data that have sufficient
board and financial data. The control sample consists of firms matched with propensity score matching. Board
turnover is measured in years −3 to −1 relative to the year of MBO announcement. Directors who are
executives, retired executives from the firm, or related to insiders are "inside" directors. Executives who are
retired from their primary profession are "professional" directors. Directors who are lawyers, accountants,
commercial bankers, corporate finance officers, investment professionals, individual investors, or directors who
are retired from these professions are "legal and finance professionals" (retired finance and legal professionals
are excluded from the "professional directors" category).
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Director departures can occur when an individual director's expertise no longer matches the firm's current
needs. Departures can also occur when monitoring time costs increase (either because of changes in the firm's
activities or a director's personal and professional circumstances) or a director disagrees with firm policies and
wishes to protect his or her reputation (see Dewally & Peck, 2010).
Table 4 shows that boards of firms with MBO offers have less turnover than boards of the control firms. For
MBO offers, 70.37% of the directors stay, but only 67.28% of directors stay for the control firms. This result
suggests directors are interested in maintaining board membership while the firm transitions from public to
private ownership. However, a lack of turnover could also reflect an entrenched board that may not act in the
best interests of shareholders in negotiating the purchase of the firm from management. Moreover, director
departures may signal an especially weak MBO offer.
Table 4 also shows that for the control sample, the frequency at which directors leave the board is offset by the
frequency at which directors join. For the MBO offer sample, slightly fewer directors join than leave. We also
test whether there are differences in the types of directors who stay, leave, or join a board across the samples.
There is no relation between types of directors and types of turnover for the control sample. For MBO offers,
active managers and professional directors are less likely to stay. Professional directors, in anticipation of an
MBO offer, might leave to find a position on another board, leave to retire from professional life altogether,
leave to avoid a time‐consuming and protracted buyout transaction, or leave as independent directors with
more expertise in buyout transactions (directors with financial and accounting backgrounds) join the board and
reduce the value of their director services. Directors who are active managers may be too busy to spend time on
additional board meetings while the board completes the MBO transaction. Active managers who join the board
might be involved with post‐buyout restructuring. Firms are likely to need directors with financial and legal
expertise during the buyout, and those directors could come and go depending on their expertise in buyouts.
Insider turnover is likely to be related to participation in the post‐buyout firm.
Next, we analyze director turnover in a multivariate setting controlling for individual director characteristics and
firm characteristics that might be related to a director's decision to stay. All firm‐level control variables are
measured at year −3, the year in which we start to measure turnover relative to the MBO offer date. For
directors who leave or join, we measure individual director characteristics—age, share ownership, and type—in
the year the director leaves or stays. For those directors who stay for all 3 years, age and share ownership are
measured at year −3. We choose to measure these characteristics at year −3 so we can assess the directors'
decision to stay on the board for the following 2 years.

Table 5 reports the results of two different specifications of a logistic regression of the likelihood that a director
will stay. In the first specification, we control only for director‐level characteristics. We include whether the
director is an outsider and if the outsider is an executive of another firm (active outsider) or a retired executive
(professional outsider) as our univariate tests show that these directors are less likely to stay on the boards of
firms with MBO offers.[2] We include the percentage of shares outstanding owned by individual directors. Share
ownership is likely to affect a director's stake in the firm and his or her decision to stay. We also include the
individual director's tenure and age. Directors with longer tenure may have exhausted their contributions to the
board and be less likely to stay. Alternatively, a long tenure might reflect entrenchment and a propensity to stay
on the board. Younger directors may have other professional opportunities or reputation concerns that can
affect their decision to stay on a board. Older directors are more likely to retire from professional life altogether.
In the second specification, in addition to director characteristics, we control for firm and board characteristics
that we reported in Table 4. Both specifications include industry (one‐digit SIC codes) fixed effects. The statistical
significance reported in the table is based on heteroscedasticity‐robust errors clustered at the firm and year
level.
5 TABLE. Board stability and a management buyout offer
Director stays (1) or leaves
or joins the board (0)
Estimate

p value

Director stays (1) or leaves
or joins the board (0)
Estimate

p
value
0.084

Firm has an MBO Offer
0.200*
0.062
0.181*
Director characteristics
Outsider
0.165
0.312
0.165
0.463
Active outsider
−0.094
0.693
−0.118
0.622
Professional outsider
−0.342**
0.048
−0.191
0.432
Director ownership
0.014*
0.091
0.013*
0.088
Age of director
0.003
0.854
0.004
0.844
Director tenure
0.081***
0.001
0.076***
0.001
Firm characteristics
Log of total assets
−0.061
0.175
Leverage
0.286
0.522
Industry‐adjusted ROA
0.875**
0.049
Industry‐adjusted Q
0.032
0.864
Board characteristics
Board size
0.002
0.946
Percentage outsiders
0.001
0.811
Percentage active
0.003
0.574
Percentage professional
−0.011**
0.037
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
N
2,367
2,367
Note. This table presents the results of logit regression specifications of the likelihood that a director stays on
the board. Management buyout offers from 1999 through 2016 are from Thomson ONE Banker. The control
sample consists of firms matched with our MBO firms through propensity score matching. Directors who are not
current or retired executives of the firm or related to insiders are "outsiders." Directors who are active
executives of other firms are "active outsider" directors. Executives who are retired from their primary
profession are "professional outsider" directors. Leverage is measured as long‐term debt over total assets. For
industry adjusted measures, we subtract the industry median defined at the two‐digit level SIC code. Firm
characteristics are measured at year −3 relative to the year of the MBO announcement. The p values are based
on heteroscedasticity‐robust errors clustered at the firm‐year level.

* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
The results of the two specifications show that the parameter estimate for the MBO offer dummy is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, from the results of our empirical tests up to this point, we
conclude that firms with MBO offers are less likely to have board turnover than otherwise similar firms. This
finding provides a benchmark that we use to further analyze directors' motives to leave the board prior to the
MBO offer. If director departures are rare, then they may be indicative of a weak MBO offer and a contentious
MBO contest.

5 IMPACT OF DIRECTOR DEPARTURES ON THE BUYOUT CONTEST
Given that most directors stay during the MBO transaction, we investigate why some directors choose to leave.
The first possible explanation is benign. Directors leave simply because executing the MBO will demand too
much of their time. Directors might also leave because they do not anticipate being a part of the MBO (through
either board membership, ownership, or management) and decide to move on to other opportunities. Under
these scenarios, we do not anticipate seeing any relation between subsequent contest events and the departure
of a director.
The second possible explanation is that directors leave because of disagreements with the terms of the buyout
and concerns about their reputation in the director market. Disagreement with the MBO executives can label
such directors as "troublemakers" and reduce future nominations to boards. Moreover, directors might be
concerned that, if they are ineffective at negotiating better terms for shareholders, they might lose
shareholders' support for future board seats. Therefore, they leave rather than stay and be forced to choose
sides (management versus shareholders). They might also be unwilling or unable to dedicate additional time in
their director role if they perceive the buyout as being contentious. Additionally, the departure of a director may
provide a signal to control‐market participants that management's offer can be improved upon. Finally, director
departures, and particularly insider departures, might reduce the board's resolve to facilitate management's
acquisition of the firm and thus provide an opening for a competitive bidder to successfully negotiate with the
board. Under any of these scenarios, the incidence of director departures is likely to be related to contest
events.
Using Lexis‐Nexis, we review all full‐text articles on each firm and collect data for up to 2 years following the
initial buyout offer on the following events: a competitive bid, a revision in management's initial offer, whether
directors reject the competitive bid or management's offer, whether directors announce they are using a "go
shop" provision, whether management adopts a takeover defense during the contest, whether shareholders
contest the offer, and the outcome of the buyout contest. Shareholders, including minority shareholders,
blockholders, or investor groups, can contest the offer by litigating the fairness of the MBO offer or the fairness
of antitakeover defenses. Managers can defend against a takeover by adopting an antitakeover amendment, by
litigating an outside bidder, by increasing management's effective stake by buying back shares, by swapping
debt for equity, by repurchasing convertible preferred or convertible debt for cash, or by privately placing
equity.
Table 6, panel A, reports, at the firm level, the frequency of events along with the frequency of firms where at
least one director—either insider or outsider—leaves or joins the board. While most buyout offers are initiated
by management (90.21%), management often revises its initial bid (37.06% of the time), and the MBO is
successful only 55.24% of the time. MBO offers are often challenged either by a shareholder group (23.78% of
the time) or a competitive bidder (20.98% of the time). Management adopts some type of takeover defense

after they make the MBO offer 26.57% of the time and revise their initial offer 37.06% of the time. Table 6
shows that challenges to the MBO offer and management's response are more likely when at least one director
leaves the board. About three quarters of the competitive bids and shareholder challenges occur when a
director departs. Management revises their initial offer 71.70% of the time when there is a director departure.
We also report the frequency of any type of event that indicates the initial MBO offer is contested: a
competitive bid, management's revision in its bid, management's adoption of a takeover defense, and
shareholders contesting the offer. We find that when at least one director leaves the board, a contested offer is
more likely and occurs 67% of the time. All these findings are statistically significant at the 10% level. We also
report the frequency of contest events with the frequency of at least one new director joining the board. If new
directors either facilitate bidding or reduce the need for bidding by ensuring that the initial management's offer
is fair (the "replacement" hypothesis), we would expect to find a statistically significant relation with directors
joining the board. We find none.

6 TABLE. The buyout contest and director turnover
Panel A: Contest events and outcome
Event
Number of firms
(percentage)
Total number of firms
143
100.00%
Management initiates buyout contest
129
90.21%
Competitive bid
30
20.98%
Management revises offer
53
37.06%
Management adopts takeover defense
38
26.57%
Shareholders contest offer
34
23.78%
Contested offer
94
65.73%
Management completes buyout
79
55.24%
Competitive bidder completes buyout
31
21.68%
Buyout fails
33
23.08%
Panel B: Firms where directors
leave the board

Number of
firms

Competitive bid

30

Contested offer

94

At least one inside
director and one
outside director leave
3
10.00%
12
12.77%

At least one director leaves
(percentage of events)
88
61.54%
80
62.02%
23
76.67%
38
71.70%
25
65.79%
25
73.53%
63
67.02%
49
62.03%
19
61.29%
20
60.61%

At least one inside
director leaves but no
outside director leaves
9
30.00%
16
17.02%

χ2 test
‐
0.722
0.055*
0.055*
0.530
0.099*
0.062*
0.894
0.974
0.900

At least one director joins
(percentage of events)
89
62.24%
80
62.02%
19
63.33%
35
66.04%
22
57.89%
22
64.71%
56
59.57%
47
59.49%
20
64.52%
22
66.67%

At least one outside
director leaves but no
inside director leaves
11
36.67%
35
37.23%

χ2 test
‐
0.868
0.889
0.472
0.519
0.734
0.363
0.452
0.768
0.550

No director
leaves

χ2 test

7
23.33%
31
32.98%

0.0276**
0.1097

Panel C: Board actions
Event
Directors reject any bid
Directors reject management's bid
Directors reject competitive bid
Directors announce shopping for bids

Panel D: Contest length

All firms

Mean contest length (months)
Median contest length (months)
Panel E: Buyout premium
Mean buyout premium (%)
Median buyout premium (%)

Number of firms
(percentage)
20
13.99%
11
7.69%
9
6.29%
21
14.69%

All firms
(𝑁𝑁 = 91)
31.65
28.57

7.86
6.50

At least one director leaves
(percentage of events)
14
70.00%
7
63.64%
7
77.78%
13
61.90%

At least one
director leaves
7.45
6.33

At least one director
leaves (𝑁𝑁 = 58)
32.89
27.03

No director
leaves
8.49
6.85

χ2 test
0.4017
‐
‐
0.9357

p value
0.3344
0.7188

No director
p value
leaves (𝑁𝑁 = 33)
29.49
0.4180
29.51
0.7003

At least one director joins
(percentage of events)
14
70.00%
10
90.91%
4
44.44%
16
76.19%

At least one
director joins
7.51
6.03

At least one director
joins (𝑁𝑁 = 59)
31.31
25.76

χ2 test
0.4401
‐
‐
0.1609

No directors
join
8.43
7.52

p value

No director joins
(𝑁𝑁 = 32)
32.29
30.91

p value

0.3691
0.1279

0.8199
0.5306

Note. This table presents the relation between director turnover and various characteristics of the buyout
contest. Director turnover is measured during the period −3 to −1 relative to the year of the MBO
announcement. Contest events are collected from the initial buyout announcement for up to 2 years following
the initial buyout offer and include a competitive bid, a revision in management's initial offer, whether directors
reject the competitive bid or management's offer, whether directors announce they are shopping for bids,
whether management adopts a takeover defense during the contest, whether shareholders' contest the offer,
and the outcome of the buyout contest. Shareholders, including minority shareholders, blockholders, or investor
groups, can contest the offer by litigating the fairness of the MBO offer or the fairness of antitakeover defenses.
Managers can defend against a takeover by adopting an antitakeover amendment, litigating against an outside
bidder, or increasing management's effective stake by buying back shares, making a debt for an equity swap,
repurchasing convertible preferred or convertible debt for cash, placing private equity, or repurchasing shares
from an investor. The contest length is measured from the announcement of the buyout to the outcome. The
buyout premium is the percentage change in the final price per share paid from the share price 4 weeks prior to
the buyout announcement.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Panel B of Table 6 further parses the frequency of firms with different types of director departures with a
competitive bid or a contested offer. Outside directors departing and inside directors departing at the firm level
are not always mutually exclusive. To create mutually exclusive categories at the firm level, we report the
frequency of firms where at least one inside director and one outside director leave; at least one inside director
leaves but no outside director leaves; at least one outside director leaves but no inside director leaves; and no
director leaves. We find that firms where only outside directors leave have the highest frequency of competitive
bids. This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. We also find some evidence that firms where only
outside directors leave have a higher frequency of contested offers. As outside and inside director departures
are not mutually exclusive at the firm level, director‐firm level regressions, which we discuss later in the paper,
provide a better test of inside versus outside departures.
Panel C of Table 6 reports the publicly announced board actions. When the board publicly announces that it is
rejecting bids or shopping for bids, it can signal to competitive bidders that it is receptive to higher offers.
Directors who depart do so knowing that board will facilitate bidding to get the best offer for shareholders (the
"board public auctioneer" hypothesis). We find that these events occur infrequently and are not associated with
directors either leaving or joining the board.
Panel D of Table 6 reports the length of the buyout contest. Most MBOs take about 6 to 8 months to complete.
We test whether directors leave when contests are longer (the "time cost" hypothesis) or whether directors
who join accelerate the completion of the contest. We find no significant differences between contest length
and director turnover. Finally, in Table 6, panel E, we report the buyout premium when the buyout is successful
(the "replacement" hypothesis). We use data from Thomson ONE Banker (SDC) to calculate the buyout premium
as the percentage change in the final price per share paid from the share price 4 weeks prior to the buyout
announcement. We find no significant difference between premiums and the type of director turnover.
To confirm at the firm level that any type of director departure is related to a competitive bid or a contested
offer, we run a test on the likelihood of net departures and the likelihood that the MBO offer is challenged while
controlling for other firm characteristics. At the firm level, there can be directors both leaving and joining the
board. Therefore, we need to create a firm‐level variable that accommodates both types of turnover and allows
us to test the relation of director departures to contest events. We use a variable that is equal to 1 when net
departures are positive and 0 otherwise. To ensure that we are measuring the effect of net departures and not

just general turnover, we control for total board turnover—the percentage of the board that changes through
replacements, additions, or departures. Furthermore, the relation between departures and the challenge to the
offer is likely to be endogenous, as directors leave in anticipation of what they believe will be a contested offer
and, concurrently, the offer is contested because director departures signal that management's offer is weak.
Tests of endogeneity indeed confirm that the likelihood of net departures and the likelihood of a challenged
offer are jointly endogenous. We therefore estimate a system of simultaneous equations to control for
endogeneity. As some of our dependent variables are discrete, we follow the method recommended in Rivers
and Vuong (1988). Moreover, besides testing whether any type of departure is related to contest events, the
regressions we estimate at the firm level serve as a reference for the subsequent regressions that we estimate
at the director level.
Table 7 reports our results about the relation of net departures and challenges to the MBO offer. The
regressions of both panels are at the firm level. In addition to the control variables included in the regressions in
Table 5, we include the length of the contest in months and whether management initiates the contest. The
initiation of the buyout by management versus an outside group can potentially affect the probability of a
competitive bid by another external group. By including the length of the contest, we can test the time cost
hypothesis.
7 TABLE. Joint determination of net director departures and a competitive bid or a contested offer
Panel A: Competitive bid
Dependent variable
Dependent variable
Net departures dummy
Competitive bid
Estimate
p
Estimate
value
Competitive bid
1.958***
0.000
Contest length
−0.008
0.427
Net departures dummy
2.514***
Turnover percentage
−0.005
Management initiates bid
−1.315**
Log of total assets
−0.226**
0.028
0.158
Leverage
0.928
0.113
−0.784
Tobin's Q industry adjusted
0.058
0.579
−0.320
ROA industry adjusted
−1.186
0.287
0.254
CEO is board chair
−0.827***
0.005
0.645
Board size
0.037
0.569
0.027
Total directors' ownership
−0.003
0.516
0.003
Total outside directors' ownership
0.018*
0.092
−0.025
Percentage of outside directors
−0.009
0.302
0.014
Median age of directors
−0.004
0.853
−0.001
Year and industry fixed effects
YES
YES
N
143
143
Panel B: Contested offer

Contested offer
Contest length

Dependent variable
Net departures dummy
Estimate
1.772***
0.000

p value
0.000
0.924

Dependent variable
Contested offer
Estimate

p value

0.000
0.423
0.016
0.161
0.258
0.240
0.839
0.112
0.705
0.597
0.208
0.199
0.958

p value

Net departures dummy
1.770***
0.000
Turnover percentage
0.000
0.977
Management initiates bid
−0.010
0.892
Log of total assets
−0.252***
0.002
0.252***
0.002
Leverage
0.904**
0.047
−0.900**
0.047
Tobin's Q industry adjusted
−0.053
0.580
0.053
0.581
ROA industry adjusted
0.029
0.972
−0.053
0.948
CEO is board chair
−0.274
0.272
0.270
0.281
Board size
0.072
0.147
−0.071
0.149
Total directors' ownership
0.003
0.413
−0.003
0.407
Total outside directors' ownership 0.008
0.346
−0.008
0.342
Percentage of outside directors
−0.007
0.339
0.007
0.332
Median age of directors
−0.018
0.290
0.018
0.286
Year and industry fixed effects
Yes
N
143
Note. This table presents the results of a simultaneous equations estimation of net departures and a competitive
bid or a contested offer. Panels A and B measure net departures as an indicator variable equal 1 if the number of
directors leaving the board is larger than the number of directors joining the board, and 0 otherwise. The sample
consists of management buyout firms from 1999 through 2016. Directors who are not current or retired
executives of the firm or related to insiders are "outsiders." A competitive bid and the contest length are
measured from the initial buyout announcement for up to 2 years following the initial buyout offer or until the
contest ends. An offer is considered contested if any of the following cases: shareholders contest the offer, a
competitive is made, management revises its bid, or an antitakeover defense is implemented within the 2‐year
period. Leverage is measured as long‐term debt over total assets. For industry adjusted measures, we subtract
the industry median defined at the two‐digit level SIC code. Firm characteristics are measured at year −3 relative
to the year of the MBO announcement. Both regressions correct for heteroscedasticity.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
In panel A of Table 7, we test the relation between net departures and a competitive bid. The results show that
after controlling for other firm characteristics, net departures are more likely when there is a competitive bid.
Concurrently, when there are net departures, the firm is more exposed to a competitive bid from an external
group. These results support the hypothesis that directors leave the firm in anticipation of a takeover fight. We
also find that net departures are less likely for boards where the CEO is also the board chair. The CEO‐board
chair duality is likely to be symptomatic of an entrenched board.
In panel B of Table 7, we test the relation between net departures and any indication of a contested MBO offer:
a competitive bid, a revision in management's initial offer, management adoption of a takeover defense during
the buyout contest, and shareholders contesting the offer via litigation. Once again, we find that net departures
are more likely when the offer is contested, reinforcing the notion that directors leave to avoid a contentious
buyout contest.
In the next test, we focus on outside directors exiting and entering the board by analyzing outsider turnover at
the director level. These director‐level regressions have the advantage of controlling for individual director
characteristics that are likely to be related to a director's decision to leave or join the board. As in the previous
multivariate analysis, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations. In this instance, the director turnover
variable is "Director Leaving vs. Joining," an indicator variable equal to 1 if the outside director leaves, 0 if the

director stays, and −1 if the director joins the board. This variable allows us to draw conclusions about why
outside directors depart vis‐à‐vis why directors chose to stay or join the board. Table 8 reports the results.
8 TABLE. Joint determination of the likelihood of outside directors leaving, staying, or joining the board and a
competitive bid or a contested offer
Panel A: Competitive bid
Dependent variable
Dependent variable
Outside director leaving
Competitive bid
vs. joining
Estimate
p value
Estimate
p value
Competitive bid
0.741***
0.000
Contest length
0.004
0.169
Active outsider
−0.093
0.126
Professional outsider
0.115
0.167
Director ownership
0.007
0.376
Director's age
0.006*
0.069
Outside director leaving vs. joining
0.777***
0.000
Management initiates bid
−0.899***
0.000
Log of total assets
−0.014
0.683
0.034
0.335
Leverage
0.029
0.886
−0.258
0.280
Tobin's Q industry adjusted
0.021
0.584
−0.219***
0.008
ROA industry adjusted
−0.209
0.591
−0.260
0.593
CEO is board chair
−0.114
0.304
0.150
0.242
Board size
−0.010
0.613
0.062***
0.004
Total directors' ownership
0.000
0.930
0.000
0.868
Total outside directors' ownership 0.002
0.683
−0.038***
0.000
Percentage of outside directors
0.005
0.178
0.010***
0.008
Median age of directors
−0.012
0.154
−0.019
0.073
Year and industry fixed effects
YES
YES
N
788
788
Panel B: Contested offer

Contested offer
Contest length
Active outsider
Professional outsider
Director ownership
Director's age
Director leaving vs. joining
Management initiates bid
Log of total assets
Leverage
Tobin's Q industry adjusted

Dependent variable
Outside director leaving vs.
joining
Estimate
0.788***
0.011***
−0.098*
0.110
0.000
0.002
−0.011
0.034
0.010

Dependent
variable
Contested offer
p value Estimate
0.000
0.000
0.060
0.120
0.947
0.422
0.585***
−0.220
0.731
0.048
0.859
−0.167
0.779
0.035

p value

0.000
0.119
0.159
0.409
0.486

ROA industry adjusted
−0.161
0.659
−0.410
0.348
CEO is board chair
−0.122
0.238
−0.096
0.416
Board size
0.011
0.571
−0.008
0.674
Total directors' ownership
−0.003
0.153
−0.008***
0.002
Total outside directors'
−0.001
0.794
−0.003
0.512
ownership
Percentage of outside directors
0.004
0.265
0.004
0.250
Median age of directors
−0.016**
0.046
−0.001
0.904
Year and industry fixed effects
YES
YES
N
788
788
Note. This table presents the results of a simultaneous equations estimation of the likelihood that a director
leaves, stays, or joins the board in the 2 years prior to a management buyout offer and, in panel A, a competitive
bid is made, or, in panel B, a contested offer is made. The sample consists of management buyout firms from
1999 through 2016. The "Director Leaving vs. Joining" variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the director leaves, 0 if
the director stays, and −1 if the director joins the board. Directors who are not current or retired executives of
the firm or related to insiders are "outsiders." Directors who are active executives of other firms are "active
outsider" directors. Executives who are retired from their primary profession are "professional outsider"
directors. Directors who share ownership, tenure, and age are measured in the year in which the director leaves
or in year 3 for directors who stay the entire period. A competitive bid, a contested offer, and the contest length
are measured from the initial buyout announcement for up to 2 years following the initial buyout offer or until
the contest ends. Leverage is measured as long‐term debt over total assets. Firm characteristics are measured at
year −3 relative to the year of the MBO announcement. Both regressions correct for heteroscedasticity.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
In Table 8, panel A, we find that the parameter estimate on the competitive bid indicator variable is positive and
statistically significantly related to outside directors leaving versus joining the board. Concurrently, outside
directors leaving versus joining the board increase the likelihood of a competitive bid. This argues against the
replacement hypothesis, which says that new outside directors facilitate bidding to ensure the best offer for
shareholders. The sign and significance of the control variables suggest that older directors are more likely to
leave the board, most likely reflecting retirement from board service. We also find that the firm is less likely to
receive a competitive bid when management initiates the buyout, possibly because management has acted pre‐
emptively. Firms that have lower industry‐adjusted Q can attract the interest of a competitive bidder who
believes it can increase the value of the firm or that the market has mispriced the firm. Competitive bidding is
also more likely if the board is larger and more independent, which is consistent with earlier research findings
that boards are important in facilitating control changes (see Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Cotter et al., 1997). Finally,
a competitive bid is less likely when outside directors own a higher share of the firm because they have more
insider voting power to block a takeover play for the firm.
In Table 8, panel B, we find that the parameter estimate on the contested offer indicator variable is positive and
statistically significantly related to outside directors leaving versus joining the board. Concurrently, when the
offer is contested, outside directors are more likely to depart. Again, these results support our hypothesis that
outside directors depart to avoid a contentious buyout contest. We also find that outside directors who are still
active in their professions are less likely to depart. These active managers are likely to be involved in post‐
buyout strategic decisions. Finally, we find that outside directors are more likely to depart when the buyout
contest takes longer. This supports the "time cost" hypothesis.

Finally, we test whether outside directors who depart from the board are replaced by new outside directors who
ensure that shareholders get a fair price for their shares. The results reported in Table 3 show that directors
depart from MBO boards at slightly less than the same rate that directors join the board. If replacement
directors ensure the fairness of the MBO offer, we expect that for MBO offers where directors depart and are
replaced by new and more effective outside directors, buyout premiums should be higher. It is also possible that
directors leave the board to make way for new directors who wish to gain experience in getting a higher
premium for shareholders. We measure replacement by adding the number of outside directors who depart to
the number of new outside directors who join the board, either replacing the departing directors or as net
additions to the board. We scale this measure by the size of the board. As more outside directors depart and
more outside directors join the board relative to board size, then the extent of outside director replacement on
the board is greater. We estimate a system of simultaneous equations like the ones reported in Table 7. In this
analysis, we use the buyout premium and the replacement percentage as the two dependent variables. Table 9
shows that the coefficient on the buyout premium is not statistically significant for the outside director
replacement percentage regression, and the coefficient on the outside director replacement percentage is not
statistically significant in the buyout premium regression. These findings do not support the alternative
hypothesis that departing outside directors are replaced by new ones who ensure shareholders receive a higher
buyout premium. We do find, as expected, that a competitive bid increases the buyout premium, and when
management initiates the buyout, premiums are lower.
9 TABLE. Joint determination of outside director replacement and buyout premium
Panel A: Competitive bid
Dependent variable
Dependent variable
Replacement percentage
Buyout premium
Estimate
p value Estimate
Buyout premium
−1.053
0.659
Contest length
−0.001
0.548
Replacement percentage
−0.950
Competitive bid
0.061*
Management initiates bid
−0.132**
Log of total assets
−1.447
0.345
−1.375
Leverage
−10.658
0.296
−10.068
Tobin's Q industry adjusted
2.764
0.429
2.669
ROA industry adjusted
−36.780**
0.025
−35.337**
CEO is board chair
0.058
0.992
0.082
Board size
−0.429
0.672
−0.405
Total directors' ownership
0.103
0.264
0.098
Total outside directors' ownership
0.325
0.114
0.308
Percentage of outside directors
0.107
0.473
0.104
Median age of directors
0.280
0.244
0.274
Year and industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
N
91
91
Panel B: Contested offer

Buyout premium
Contest length

Dependent variable
Turnover percentage
Estimate
−0.898
0.000

p value
0.444
0.839

Dependent variable
Buyout premium
Estimate

p value
0.439
0.089
0.010
0.345
0.299
0.422
0.023
0.988
0.673
0.260
0.115
0.464
0.228

p value

Turnover percentage
−1.113
0.373
Competitive bid
0.054*
0.092
Management initiates bid
0.020
0.179
Log of total assets
−1.042
0.570
−1.159
0.570
Leverage
−10.942
0.349
−12.183
0.350
Tobin's Q industry adjusted
2.027
0.581
2.269
0.579
ROA industry adjusted
−35.790
0.153
−39.975
0.152
CEO is board chair
−0.106
0.986
−0.120
0.986
Board size
−0.319
0.767
−0.356
0.767
Total directors' ownership
0.073
0.465
0.082
0.464
Total outside directors' ownership
0.261
0.165
0.290
0.166
Percentage of outside directors
0.119
0.632
0.133
0.630
Median age of directors
0.205
0.753
0.207
0.444
Year and industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
N
91
91
Note. This table presents the results of a simultaneous equations estimation of replacement percentage and the
buyout premium. The sample consists of completed management buyouts of firms from 1999 through 2016.
Replacement percentage is calculated by adding the number of outside directors who depart to the number of
new outside directors who join the board divided by the size of the board. The buyout premium is the
percentage change in the final price per share paid from the share price four weeks prior to the buyout
announcement. Directors who are not current or retired executives of the firm or related to insiders are
"outsiders." A competitive bid, a contested offer, and contest length, are measured from the initial buyout
announcement for up to 2 years following the initial buyout offer or when the contest ends. Leverage is
measured as long‐term debt over total assets. Firm characteristics are measured at year −3 relative to the year
of the MBO announcement. Both regressions correct for heteroscedasticity.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
In summary, the overall weight of our empirical results supports the hypothesis that outside directors leave
when the buyout offer is weak and likely to be contested. We do not find any evidence to support alternative
explanations—that directors leave expecting the board to act as a public auctioneer or that directors depart and
are replaced by new directors who ensure the fairness of the offer. We do find some evidence that outside
directors leave in anticipation of a lengthy contest. Our findings are consistent with Wright et al.'s (2010)
findings for Chinese MBOs. While they do not examine outside director departures prior to the MBO, they do
examine independent directors' propensity to agree with management via meeting minutes and find that the
majority do not challenge management. Thus, it appears that independent or outside directors' reluctance to
overtly disagree with management is a global phenomenon.

6 CONCLUSION
Researchers' understanding of the role that outside directors play in monitoring managers has evolved as
reflected by the change of Jensen's positions from 1983 to 1993. Earlier studies support the notion that outside
directors monitor managers on behalf of shareholders (e.g., Brickley et al., 1994; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Cotter
et al., 1997; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988). Later studies focus on outside directors' incentives to
monitor and the factors that affect their monitoring quality (e.g., Fich & Shivdasani, 2007; Harford, 2003;
Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Yermack, 2004). This study investigates outside director departures before MBO
offers, which are transactions in which outside directors can provide value to the shareholders who elect them

by negotiating for the best terms from management or another bidder. Yet we find evidence that outside
directors are likely to flee, especially when the offer is contested. They either leave to avoid advocating for
shareholders in a contested buyout offer or to signal to other bidders that the offer is weak and can be
improved upon. When they flee, they are not effective monitors of the buyout contest. Had they stayed on the
board to fight, they could have remained actively involved in the MBO contest by soliciting higher bids, arguing
against takeover defenses designed to discourage bidding, and steering board deliberations toward advocating
for the best offer on behalf of the shareholders. This study adds to research that investigates director
departures as a possible symptom of problems within the firm (e.g., Agrawal & Chen, 2017; Dewally &
Peck, 2010; Farrell & Whidbee, 2000; Fields & Gupta, 2009). Our results suggest that future research
investigating other motivations and circumstances of board turnover can be fruitful. In turn, these future studies
can provide greater insight into how boards function as an internal monitoring mechanism to safeguard
shareholder wealth. Additionally, studies using samples from different countries can tease out board functioning
driven by differences in laws, regulations, and culture from those driven by universal characteristics of board
decision making.
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Footnotes
1 While we use the terminology "years −1 to −3" relative to the MBO announcement for ease in exposition, for
our sample of MBOs' year −1 relative to the announcement, the proxy statement data are from, on
average, 6.84 months (median 6.83 months) prior to the announcement. Firms typically announce MBOs
prior to issuing a proxy statement with deal information to shareholders. This usually happens only once
the deal is close to being finalized. Further, in our sample, we include failed MBOs that never issue such
proxy statements. Thus, we use the proxy statement that is closest in time before the announcement to
determine board composition preceding the announcement.
2 In alternative specifications, we replace "Professional Outsider" with "Financial Outsider." The financial
outsider indicator is not significant, while our main result persists.
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